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The paper …nds empirical evidence on the ripple e¤ect of sunspots
on the interwar German economy. It identi…es a sequence of negative
shocks to expectations for the 1927 to 1932 period. The arti…cial econ-
omy predicts the 1928-1932 depression and a long boom from 1933
onwards. Overall, a tangible fraction of interwar output volatility is
attributed to sunspots.
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Over the past decade the literature on indeterminacy in macroeconomics
has moved from slight obscurity into the spotlight by demonstrating that
otherwise standard models can exhibit multiple equilibria, and, moreover,
that nonfundamental shocks (a.k.a. sunspots or animal spirits) can generate
dynamics that resemble observed aggregate ‡uctuations.1 For sunspots to
be an accepted explanation for business cycles, however, it is vital that the
implications be supported by empirical evidence. The present paper o¤ers
such evidence and it does so by looking at one of the most troubling of
cyclical episodes: the Great Depression in Germany.
1.1 Map of the paper
This paper unfolds in four parts. The …rst part assigns theory. Sunspot
models are distinguished from other models in that their original source
of economic ‡uctuations is found in shocks to expectations. The chosen
theoretical model here is a non-monetary, fully speci…ed dynamic general
equilibrium model with increasing returns of a magnitude consistent with
empirical evidence. The size of scale economies is signi…cant enough to give
rise to equilibria which are indeterminate; hence non-fundamental expecta-
tions matter.
The arti…cial economy is exploited to derive the sunspot shocks in the
second part of the paper. The model will be calibrated to German long-run
averages. Then data will be …ltered through the model to ferret out residu-
als. Speci…cally, sunspots are uncovered by sifting out the part of the cali-
brated model that is not explained by fundamentals so as to re‡ect changes
in extrinsic uncertainty. The paper …nds a sequence of pernicious sunspot
shocks that seeped into the German economy from 1927:IV to 1932:III. This
roughly coincides with the economic cycle: the Germanbusiness cycle peaked
in the …rst quarter of 1928 and passed its trough in the third quarter of 1932
(see Figure 1).
The e¤ects of the estimated sunspot innovations will be traced in the
third part of the paper. I check the forecasting ability of sunspots and test
the predictive power of the model, i.e. the empirical shocks will be fed back
into the model. I …nd that sunspot impulses can account for a signi…cant
portion of the interwar cycle in Germany. The fourth part probes various
dimensions of the results’ robustness.
The paper thus provides new support to Temin’s (1971) interpretation of
the German Depression. Temin stresses a fall in domestic demand, however,
he leaves unexplained the ultimate cause of the plunge:
”Sales, un…lled orders, expectations; these are the items we








1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Private output Total output
1928:I=100
Figure 1: Per capita outputs (deviations from linear 1925-1938 trends).
Total output is GNP (Bruttosozialprodukt zu Marktpreisen von 1913). Pri-
vate output is sum of the private sector’s consumption and investment ex-
penditures (Konsum der privaten Haushalte and Investitionen des Unter-
mehmensektors; in 1913-prices). Original source of data: Ritschl (2002b);
1925:I - 1938:III.
are told in‡uence investment. [...] To elucidate the nature of this
change, attention must be shifted from the international econ-
omy to the domestic and from supply considerations to demand.”
[Temin, 1971, p. 248]
The …ndings here suggest that it was sunspots which had a ripple e¤ect
on aggregate demand and, consequently, on the German economy.
1.2 Methodology and related work
The paper is related to recent attempts that employ theoretical models
to trace the sources of economic ‡uctuations (most notably Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan’s, 2002, accounting framework). It also resembles work that
computes historical sunspots (for example Harrison and Weder, 2005). More
speci…cally, within a dynamic general equilibrium framework, the current pa-
per builds on and modi…es a method originally developed by She¤rin and
Salyer (1998) for post-war U.S. data. In a nutshell, She¤rin and Salyer un-
cover sunspots from a version of the Farmer and Guo (1994) model. This
economy is driven by both fundamental technology shocks and by sunspot
shocks. Sunspot expectations matter since the model accommodates in-
creasing returns which result inan indeterminacy: the well-speci…eddynamic
general equilibrium model includes an expectational-error term which stands
for the non-fundamental changes in expectations. Using …nancial markets in
conjunction with this error term, She¤rin and Salyer (1998) send U.S. data
2through the model. It then becomes possible to extract period-by-period er-
ror terms, i.e. sunspots. The use of the error-term parallels the methodology
promoted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002, 2004). Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan advocate a business cycle accounting approach as the only fruit-
ful technique for guiding the development of business cycle models. Given
the availability of useful theoretical models, there is no reason to employ
methods that use only a minimal amount of theory such as structural vector
autoregressions (SVAR). In particular, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan claim
that SVARs are no reliable technique for pointing to the sources of economic
‡uctuations.
Several important di¤erences distinguish She¤rin and Salyer’s (1998)
work from mine: (i) the underlying theoretical model is di¤erent – the
Farmer and Guo (1994) economy requires unrealistically large increasing
returns to scale – (ii) I do not employ …nancial markets, (iii) sunspots are
sifted out from the model equation’s residuals in di¤erent ways, and (iv) the
forecasting power of shocks to expectations is determined.
To my knowledge, Fisher and Hornstein (2002) and Weder (2003) are
the only other approaches which attempt to explain the Great Depression
in Germany using dynamic general equilibrium theory. Both …nd a deterio-
ration in total factor productivity which accounts for a substantial decline
in economic activity – yet both claim that a complete explanation requires
many more inputs such as …scal shocks and labor market distortions (in
the case of Fisher and Hornstein) or taste shocks (in Weder’s case). These
mentioned papers rely on theoretical inclusiveness in the hope of drawing
together varying approaches to show how these contribute to a more com-
plete explanation. The paper here neglects other shocks. This does not rule
out other factors such as the above mentioned. However, the monocausal
strategy applied here allows the e¤ects of expectations to be analyzed in
isolation.
Another conceptual issue pertains to the notion of equilibriumeconomics.
Equilibrium business cycle models – such as the one advocated here – banish
the notion of involuntary unemployment essentially because of its unsound
distinction and as an intricate concept. Business cycles are not interpreted
as deviations from equilibrium but decoded as ‡uctuations of the equilibrium
itself: the out-of-work must have chosen rest over employment, however, the
equilibrium concept does not presume that the non-employed relish depres-
sions:
”Of course, the hypothesis of a cleared labor market carries
with it no such suggestion, any more than the observation that
people go hungry in cleared food markets suggest that people
enjoy hunger.” [Lucas, 1977, p. 226].
More importantly, equilibria do not necessitate Pareto-e¢ciency: the ar-
ti…cial economy that will be outlined shortly is interspersed with imperfect
3product markets and any realized equilibrium represents a ‡aw in the econ-
omy that a rearrangement of resources could correct at no cost to anyone. In
short, the labor market is modelled as if in equilibrium, therefore, the con-
troversy is not whether unemployment is involuntary but instead whether
the level of employment is e¢cient. It clearly isn’t.
2 The arti…cial economy
This Section presents the theoretical model, discusses the calibration and
reports on qualitative dynamics. The economy builds on the standard dy-
namic general equilibrium model. There are several departures from the
plain-vanilla real business cycles model: the pace of capital utilization rate
is endogenously set, technology displays internal economies to scale and
markets for intermediate products are monopolistic competitive.2 Taken
together, these departures lead to equilibria that are not uniquely deter-
mined by preferences and technology: the arti…cial economy may be driven
by non-fundamental shocks to expectations.
The economy consists of two sectors. The …nal goods sector is perfectly
competitive. Final goods production assembles distinct intermediate inputs







0 < À < 1 (1)
where i 2 [0;1]. Any …nal goods …rm will potentially make pro…ts




where pt denotes the good’s competitive price. Assuming free entry in the
market for …nal goods, the pro…ts will be zero. The conditional demand for

















Here, pi;t is intermediate good i’s price and pt is the exact price index.
Monopolistic competitors produce intermediate products and have access to
an increasing returns to scale technology given by
yi;t = zt(utki;t)®l
¯
i;t ® + ¯ > 1: (3)
Firms rent the services from labor, li;t, and capital, ki;t, from the household
at the competitive rental rates wt and rt. The households decide on the
2The models by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988), Farmer and Guo (1994)
and Wen (1998) – to which my model is related – feature similar attributes.
4index of the use of capital, ut. It is taken as a given by the …rms. zt is the
state of technological knowledge which is determined outside the model. It
follows the …rst-order autoregressive process
lnzt = (1 ¡³)lnz + ³ lnzt¡1 + "t 0 < ³ < 1: (4)
The shocks to technology, "t, are uncorrelated at all leads and lags and
uncorrelated with zt¡j rj > 0. They are the part of zt that cannot be pre-
dicted based on past values of the variables of the model. Each monopolistic
competitor’s pro…t maximization is given by the static problem
max
li;t;utki;t
pi;tyi;t ¡wtli;t ¡rtutki;t s.t. (2) and (3)
where the maximand is concave in inputs whenever (®+¯)À is less or equal
to one. In fact, I will restrict (® +¯)À = 1 which implies zero average pure
pro…ts. The assumption is on congenial terms with data reported by Sweezy
(1940).3 The factor demands of …rm i are
wt = ¯Àpi;tzt(utki;t)®l
¯¡1
i;t and rt = ®Àpi;tzt(utki;t)®¡1l
¯
i;t (5)
that is, …rms are renting e¤ective capital units, i.e. utki;t. The reason is
the following. Technology displays a nonconvexity if the usual commodity
point is employed: an alternative commodity is needed. My approach is
to assume that …rms demand e¤ective capital units. Phrased alternatively,
from the …rm’s point of view, output can be increased by running existing
machines more intensely or by putting into operation additional machines.
The …rms do not care how the increase is realized; the decision is made
by the households who own the capital stock and who can decide on the
utilization rate.
All intertemporal decisions are administered by the household sector.
Households supply labor to and purchase output from the …rms. The stand-




½tu(ct;1 ¡lt) 0 < ½ < 1 (6)
where ct and ½ stand for consumption and the discount factor. The period
utility function is assumed to have the form
u(ct;1 ¡lt) = ´logct ¡(1 ¡´)lt 0 < ´ < 1:
The fact that labor enters linearly into the utility function follows the as-
sumption that labor is indivisible, utility is separable in consumption and
3Splitting up the capital income into rental and pure pro…t income, for example, would
change the model insofar as to make it even easier to obtain indeterminacy.
5in leisure and agents trade employment lotteries. Et is the expectations op-
erator, conditional on all information available in periods t and earlier. The
capital accumulation equation
kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±t)kt +wtlt + rtutkt + ¦t ¡ct (7)
is a standard one except for the variable depreciation rate, ±t. Depreciation





t µ > 1:
Higher utilization causes faster depreciation because of wear and tear on the
capital stock. ¦t represents pure pro…t income arising from the presence of
market power. Factor prices (and pro…t income) are taken as given by the






















t = rt: (10)
In addition, the budget constraint
kt+1 = (1 ¡±t)kt + yt ¡ ct
and the usual transversality condition – given the initial stock of capital,
k(0) > 0 – must hold. Equation (8) describes the consumption-leisure trade-
o¤, (9) is the intertemporal Euler equation. (10) characterizes the e¢cient
level of capital utilization. It states that capital should be utilized at a rate
which sets the marginal user costs equal to the marginal bene…t of capital
services.
In symmetric equilibrium, we have ki;t = kt; li;t = lt; yi;t = yt; and
pi;t = pt = 1. The last equality comes from the zero pro…ts condition in
the …nal goods sector with …nal goods being the numeraire. The …rst-order





















and, consequently, the commodity point selection does not change the usual
forms of these Euler equations.4
Next, I calibrate the model using parameter values that mimic certain
ratios of the actual German economy that are more or less constant (Table
4See for example Greenwood et al. (1998) or Wen (1998).
61). Time evolves in discrete units and periods are speci…ed to be one quarter
long. Signi…cant market power is widely reported for interwar Germany.
For example, Kellenbenz (1981) estimates the rise of cartels from 233 to
1539 in the period from 1905 to 1925. To o¤er an idea of the extent of
market power, Bloch (1932) compares price indices of raw material and
semi…nished products arranged by commodities for domestic (i.e. German)
and foreign consumption. Over the 1929 to 1932 period, the domestic price
level was about 30 percent above the world price level. A high degree of
de facto cartelization was also widespread in the agricultural sector due to
the political in‡uence of East Elbian Junkers. In this respect, Kindleberger
(1986) notes that the market power combined with import restrictions
”[...] raised German agricultural prices to Rm 2 billion above
the level of world prices in 1932.” [Kindleberger, 1986, p. 132]
The capital share is 25 percent. No reliable estimate of markups for
interwar Germany is available, however. I assume that the average markup
is 20 percent. This implies that À = 0:83 so that the elasticity of substitution
between varieties of intermediate goods is about 6. Consequently, the zero-
pro…t condition implies that returns to scale amount to 1=À = 1:20. This is
substantially lower than in Farmer and Guo (1994). It is also smaller than
the value that is reported by Gehrig and Kuhlo (1961). Gehrig and Kuhlo
estimate a macroeconomic production function for Germany 1925-1938 and
1950-1957. They …nd substantial increasing returns ranging from 1.31 to 1.4.
My parameter selection for À allows me to err on the conservative side. The
choice is within the span reported by Basu and Fernald (1997) who conclude
that increasing returns fall within the 1.02 to 1.26 orbit. The steady state
rate of depreciation is 3 percent per annum. The discount factor, ½, is set
such that the steady state capital-output ratio is 4:18 which is the empirical
observed value (information on great ratios, income shares and depreciation
rates draws on Ritschl, 2002b). The utility weight ´ has no in‡uence on
equilibrium dynamics and is therefore not needed to be calibrated.
Denoting steady state values with no time subscripts, the unique steady



















These conditions imply a value of 1:99 for the elasticity of depreciation with
respect to utilization, µ. The steady state investment share on output, x=y,
is 17 percent.
7I take a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions to obtain






















Hatted variables denote percent deviations from their steady-state values.
M is the 3 £ 3 Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives. The term !t+1 ´
Etb ct+1 ¡ b ct+1 denotes the expectational error. Its role is as follows. Con-
sumption is a non-predetermined variable whereas capital is predetermined.
If exactly one eigenvalue of M is outside the unit circle, the model is unique
(i.e. saddle-path stable); unless the extraneous random variable !t+1 is re-
moved, the economy would eventually violate the transversality conditions.
With the presence of market power, however, we do not have the guarantee
that the equilibrium is unique. Indeterminacy of rational expectations re-
quires that both eigenvalues of M are inside the unit circle. This situation
implies that equilibria are possible in which ‡uctuations in economic activity
may be driven by arbitrary and self-ful…lling changes in people’s expecta-
tions. Rational expectations require that expectational errors be essentially
random errors which are uncorrelated with the information obtained and
processed: in a word, people make no systematic mistakes.
Sunspot cycles are generated in the model in the following manner. Let
there be a pessimistic shock to expectations unrelated to any available fun-
damental data – the …rst step in a harmful sequence of events. In particular,
people believe that the future income stream dwindles. The households re-
spond by reducing today’s consumption expenditures and by increasing the
supply of labor. To understand the e¤ect of the change in expectations on
employment, one must regard that labor demand is unconventionally sloped






















Given Table 1’s calibration, the e¤ective labor-output elasticity ¯µ=(µ ¡®)
exceeds unity for markups (or, equivalently, increasing returns to scale)
larger than 1:16: the reduced-form labor demand curve is upward slop-
ing. Now, the sunspot-driven shift in labor supply reduces employment and
investment today. Therefore, the future capital stock and output will be
low and the initially pessimistic undercurrent about future income is self-
ful…lled. This completes the circuit.
83 Unearthing sunspots
This Section checks whether nonfundamental changes in expectations can
explain the ‡uctuations that occurred in Germany during the interwar pe-
riod. In the context of the model, in other words, among the in…nite number
of possible sequences of the expectational errors in (11), I seek the one that
I believe best describes the behavior of peoples’ extrinsic uncertainty dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s period. Then, the e¤ects of the estimated sunspot
innovations will be traced and the predictive power of the model will be
inspected.
Technology shocks are customarily estimated as residuals from a Solow
decomposition. In other words, these shocks are not directly observable;
measurement takes place within a particular model – a production function.
Taking the theoretical model as a starting point, the current paper derives
sunspots directly from model equations as well.
A note on the observational equivalence between sunspot models and
Real Business Cycles (RBC) is compulsory. Cole and Ohanian (1999) and
Kamihigashi (1996) show that if the exogenous technology shock process is
not restricted, then the following correspondence exists: one will always be
able to …nd a series of sunspot shocks paired with increasing returns to scale
that will replicate a technology shock driven RBC model and vice versa.
Phrased alternatively, the economic modeler needs additional information
otherwise it is not possible to identify sunspots. One way the equivalence
can be broken is to impose a restriction on the exogenous process (see Cole
and Ohanian, 1999). In the current model, exogenous technology follows
a …rst-order process. Of course, this assumption might not be altogether
satisfactory. To lesser the quandary, the estimation of technology shocks
will take place along two competing strategies: a Solow decomposition that
yields the e¢ciency wedge and an atheoretical model. The latter follows the
SVAR-based approach promoted by Gali (1999) and others. I will show that
both methods deliver very similar sequences (this may come to some surprise
given the critique on SVARs put fourth by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan,
2004). Once the technology shocks are pinned down, the model structure
allows the identi…cation of sunspot noise.
Now, sunspots are unearthed as follows. Let us recall equation (11).
In the absence of any other form of uncertainty, the term !t+1 is a belief
shock. By …ltering data on per capita consumption, capital and total factor
productivity through the model, an empirical sequence of residuals f!tg can
be computed.
There is no a priori reasoning to expect that the belief shocks are un-
correlated to fundamental disturbances. For example, Pigou (1929) took
a somewhat lenient stance on sunspots and has put forth an agnostic in-
terpretation of sunspots as overreactions to fundamental shocks. Here, I
de…ne sunspots as the changes to expectations that are not connected to
9fundamentals. This, then, conforms to a de…nition of sunspots that is much
stricter than Pigou’s.
All this is done as follows. The consumption equation residual can be de-
composedinto apart whichis relatedto technology shocks andinto sunspots.
The natural way of orthogonalization is to regress technology shocks on the
consumption equation residual. If both shocks are found to be uncorrelated,
this would indicate that f!tg does not simply capture disturbances on the
supply side.
To begin with, German total factor productivity, zd
t , is tallied by carrying
out a Solow decomposition (the superscript d denotes data). The e¢ciency









Here capital utilization is variable and the production function is increasing
returns to render the total factor productivity (TFP) estimation compatible
with the theoretical model. Utilization, ud
t, is instrumented by the HP-
deviations of output so as to account for the cyclical intensity that capital
is working. The instrument was transformed such that 25 percent of capital
was idled at the business cycle trough – consistent with evidence by Bres-
nahan and Ra¤ (1991); Meester (1961) suggests an even larger fall. The
Solow-based technology shocks can then be computed from the …rst-order
autoregressive process (4).
Of course, the e¢ciency wedge itself may be a noisy measure of true
supply shocks (see Hall, 1990). To check for the appropriateness of the
Solow decomposition, I alternatively apply Gali’s (1999) method: SVAR-
measurement of technology shocks with the key identifying assumption that
it is only technology shocks that can generate permanent e¤ects on produc-
tivity. This long-run identifying restriction translates into estimating the
productivity equation
¢qd










Here, as in Shapiro and Watson (1988), Francis and Ramey (2002) or Fran-
cis, Owyang and Theodorou (2003), I con…ne hours to appear in double dif-
ferenced form, i.e. non-technology disturbances cannot generate permanent
e¤ects on labor productivity, qd
t. The equation’s residuals can be interpreted
as technology shocks. I employ an instrumental variables regression. As in
Francis and Ramey (2002), I use b = 4 lags of ¢qd
t and ¢ld
t as instruments.
Figure 2 plots the theoretical versus the atheoretical shocks. The calculated
shocks are remarkably similar: the correlation of the shock-series is 0.89;
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Solow shocks SVAR shocks
Figure 2: Theoretical and atheoretical supply shocks
Thus, at the stage at which sunspot shocks will be calculated, I can rely
on technology shocks being reliably identi…ed. I will continue using Solow’s
method to keep matters consistent with the theoretical model.
Since the variables in equation (11) are measured as deviations from
the steady state, an estimation of the steady state values is necessary. Ac-
cordingly, I linearly detrend series individually. All data are taken from






2 = 0:008 SER = 0:0306:
Of note is the small explanatory power of the regression as measured by R
2
and the insigni…cance of the regressor. It does not matter for the interpre-
tation of the error terms if one follows Pigou or not: technology shocks do
not cause the identi…ed belief shocks. Moreover, for serial correlation up
to fourth-order, the Breusch-Godfrey test statistics do not reject the null
of zero serial correlation (Table 2). Therefore, the sequence of sunspots
appears to be in line with the assumption of rational expectations.
Figure 3 shows that pessimism started to engulf the German economy
during 1927.5 In fact I am able to unearth an unfavorable sequence of
sunspots from 1927:IV to 1932:II. This sequence roughly coincides with the
economic cycle. The business cycle peak occurred in 1928:I and the economy
went through its trough in 1932:III. Likewise, con…dence reaches a plateau
in 1926, it does not recover before 1932:II and it rises on average throughout
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Figure 3: German sunspots as identi…ed from arti…cial economy
the 1930s. Only by 1936 does the upsurge come to a pause.6 The …ndings
imply that German expectations changed direction well before the U.S. cycle
peaked. This is in line with the hypothesis originally promoted by Temin
(1971) and recently picked up again by Ritschl (1999, 2002a).7
Next, I address a potential pitfall of the sunspot extracting procedure
and ask whether calculated sunspots are caused by other fundamental vari-
ables. Here I apply Geweke, Meese andDent’s (1983) small samples causality
tests.8 I evaluate whether possible fundamentals decrease the forecast vari-
ance of sunspots. Table 3 …nds no evidence that the calculated sunspots are
caused by considered fundamentals (in‡ation, government spending, de…cit,
wage bill, interest rates, and a monetary aggregate). The exception is the
…rst-di¤erenced de…cit to output ratio at 4 lags: the implied p-value is 0.062.
However, this result does not carry over for shorter or longer lags and it also
does not carry over when the non-di¤erenced de…cit ratio is considered: the
p-value rises to 0.142.
By way of showing this non-causality, it is palpable that the use of a
6The above sunspot-series is by no means dependent on the way capital utilization is
measured in z
d
t . In slight model-inconsistency, I …nd that the correlation of the above
series of sunspots and one that arises when utilization is constant is 0.995 (when both
utilization and returns to scale are constant, the correlation is 0.987).
7In particular Ritschl suggests a worsening of the business climate.
8Let the residual variance of sunspots be ¾
2 and '
2 when a fudamental is included as
explanatory variable in the aautoregression. Let the number of observations be N and the
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asymptotically under the null of no Granger causality. See also Matsusaka and Sbodorne
(1995). A previous version of the paper apllied a standard Granger test: the results were
identical.
12model with only two shocks does not create a bias in the estimation of the
sunspots: the calculated sunspots do not pick up any in‡uence that perhaps
could operate through the considered fundamental variables.
4 Do sunspots matter?
Up to this point, I have found indications of pessimistic sunspots that began
to surface sometime during 1927. The current Section will trace the eco-
nomic e¤ects of the estimated swings of expectations. First I will present
results of an empirical investigation to determine how well sunspots predict
economic activity. The second part addresses the role of sunspots within a
fully speci…ed dynamic general equilibrium. That is, the identi…ed historical
sunspots will be fed into the model; data and arti…cial output series will be
confronted.
4.1 The (forecasting) power of sunspots
This Subsection determines how well sunspots predict output. It relays
the outcome of forecasting regressions for output growth and discusses the
…ndings of a vector autoregression analysis.9
Do sunspots help predict output growth? I examine the predictive power
of sunspots by regressing movements on lagged sunspot innovations on out-
put growth:
¢lnyd




The reduced-form forecasting model (12) attempts to isolate the indepen-
dent contribution of sunspots. Here ¢lnyd
t is the growth rate of per capita
output (data) and Zt is a vector of control variables which is comprised
of a number of fundamental variables. The control variables included in
Zt are the four lags of the growth in the real wage bill and four lags of
…rst-di¤erences of the interest rate (Privatdiskont in Berlin). Of course, the
choice of controls is somewhat arbitrary. The role of the controls is to a¤ect
the path of aggregate output for other reasons than animal spirits. The
choice of the interest rate and wage income can be thought of in attempting
to capture the e¤ects of monetary policy and credit-rationing.10 Again, data
are quarterly and cover 1925:I through 1938:IV.
The top panel of Table 4 shows estimations of equation (12) without
control variables. The measure of economic signi…cance is the increase of
R
2. Lagged values of sunspots, taken on their own, explain a substantial
9Bram and Ludvigson (1997) conduct a similar exercise to examine the role of con…-
dence on consumption.
10Adding variables will surely involve econometric risk given the small sample.
13portion of output. Speci…cally, sunspots explain between 11 and 16 percent
of the variation in output one quarter hence. While this …nding shows that
sunspots by themselves help to predict the future path of output, a more
important question is whether sunspots contain information not captured
by economic fundamentals. Do sunspots still forecast output to a signi…cant
degree once the control variables are included in equation (12)?
The information content of sunspots can be assessed by recording the
increase to R
2: the fraction of the variance of output growth explained by
adding sunspot lags to the baseline regression. The lower part of Table 4
shows statistical results from running the regression (12) on both the sunspot
lags and the control variables; no doubt at econometric risk given that 13
coe¢cients are being estimated in a sample of 52 observations. In the case
of private GNP, the signi…cance of nonfundamental con…dence stays put:
R
2 rises substantially by 10 percent when sunspots are added to the set of
control variables and the coe¢cients on the four lags of sunspots are esti-
mated to be statistically signi…cant at better than the 1 percent level. As for
total GNP, the margin is narrower and the evidence more murky. Sunspots
contribute about 8 percent to the R
2 and, more importantly, the four lags
are only jointly signi…cant at only the 6 percent level. For the purpose of the
current paper, private output may constitute the more pertinent variable to
check against since by de…nition sunspots a¤ect predominantly the private
sector.
For an alternative way to gauge whether sunspots have had much of
a role in accounting for movements in output, Table 5 reports variance de-
compositions for various time horizons based on the 1925 to 1938 estimation
period.11 Underlying the analysis is a bivariate, unrestricted vector autore-
gression (VAR) containing sunspots and output. Sunspots are ordered …rst
in the VAR. This is consistent with the assumption that sunspots in‡uence
output contemporaneously, but output in‡uences expectations only with a
one period lag. The VARs suggest that sunspots account for between 25 to
75 percent of the output forecast variance at a three year horizon.
Figure 4 summarizes the dynamic relationship between sunspots and
output. The chart shows the responses of log private output to an innovation
in con…dence. The lines above and below the impulse response are the
probability bands which are generated by taking 1000 Monte Carlo draws
from the posterior distribution of the VAR coe¢cients. Sunspot shocks have
a very persistent e¤ect on output. The strongest response is about one-and-
11In a sense, variance decompositions of this sort are a harder test than simply comparing
the output amplitudes of data and of the sunspot driven model as is normally done in the
RBC literature. In fact, when the sequence of sunspots is fed into the model, the model
variance exceeds data’s by factor three. The reasoning for this is that in the presence of
variable capital utilization, consumption becomes extremely smooth. There is a solution
to this puzzle by departing from logarithmic utility (see Weder, 2002). Since I am only
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Figure 4: Impulse responses. VAR as in Table 5.
a-half years after the impact.12
Overall, I interpret these results as an indication of sunspots’ pertinent
role during the Great Depression. Granted the analysis up to this point has
not considered the model and – at this point of the discussion – it is not
clear whether theory would in fact produce a sequence of arti…cial economic
activity that resembles that of the actual economy. This is will be shown in
the following Sections.
4.2 Injecting sunspots – a visual clue
The following Subsections will provide clues of how sunspot theory tracks
the German interwar cycle. To that avail, an arti…cial output series is de-
rived by feeding the empirical sunspot series back into the model (11). The
procedure encompasses tautology and unlike Chari, Kehoe and McGrat-
tan’s (2002) accounting scheme, there is nothing to expect that every facet
of the business cycle can be explained by the sunspots shocks. First of all,
sunspots have been derived from a subset of equations that constitute the
general equilibrium of the economy and therefore the procedure is not an
accounting exercise. Second, the sequence of estimated shocks is dependent
on the speci…c theoretical model. Two scenarios are possible that would
question my claim that sunspots matter. (i) the model is a poor description
of the German economy: the shocks are signi…cant in the sense of adjusting
12The respective charts for total output are very similar, however, the (initial) output
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Figure 5: Arti…cial output. Scaled to match 75 percent of data volatility.
the model’s prediction such to pick up alternative sources of ‡uctuations.
This, however, is not the case. The causality tests suggest that the con-
sidered fundamental forces do not drive the calculated sunspots. (ii) the
model is correct and able to pick up the true sunspots, but sunspots are not
an important source of the German cycle. As a consequence, arti…cial and
German output di¤er substantially. The following Subsections attempt to
monitor any such di¤erences.
Before conducting quantitative tests, Figure 5 graphically presents the
behavior of arti…cial output. The putative impulses are ‡uctuations in
sunspot expectations. The model economy does extremely well in capturing
the general pattern of output. That is, the model correctly reaches a plateau
in 1927, it predicts the upper turning point, the slide into the Depression as
well as the beginning of the recovery more than four years later.
4.3 Sunspot theory in action
Figure 5’s graphical characterization remains uninformative unless a quan-
titative test of the sunspot theory of the Great Depression is provided. This
will be done next.
A natural starting point is to regress model output, ym
t , on linearly
detrended total output, y
t;d





















2 = 0:909 SER = 0:0432:
The coe¢cients are highly signi…cant and a substantial fraction of the sample
variance is explained. At …rst glance, this …nding evokes that the sunspot
model mimics fairly closely the actual behavior of output. Moreover, when
the arti…cial economy appears in lagged form, the regressions improve which
indicates that model output leads the Germancycle. Nevertheless, the above
regressions cannot be seen as a logical a¢rmation in favor of or against a
sunspot-based interpretation of the German Depression: the ability to mimic
the economy’s cyclical pattern is a necessary but not a su¢cient condition
that any theory should be able pass. Stronger evidence would be to show
that sunspots provide added apprehension over rival modelling structures
(see also Salyer and She¤rin, 1998, which I follow here).
Time series econometrics allows data to be distinguished in atheoretical
ways. For example, modelling aggregate output as a low-order autoregressive
or moving-average process generates reasonable …ts. If the sunspot approach
to business cycles conveys anything unique about the German economy it
must provide some advantage relative to atheoretical time series models. I
implement this investigation by estimating equations of the following form
lnyd






The idea behind conducting these tests is that by adding output from the
sunspot model to the regression, one obtains a measure of to what extent
sunspots provide additional informational content.
Let us begin with the autoregressive model. A lag length of n = 3 (4)
was determined to remove fourth-order serial correlation for private (total)
GNP. The time series model’s predictive power is large – it explains over
93 percent of the variation in output one quarter hence (Lines 1 and 3 in
Table 6). The Table also shows that the sunspot model contains incremental
explanatory power onprivate and total output (Lines 2 and 4). The standard
errors of the regressions fall by 15 (11) percent and the probability that the
explanatory power is produced by pure chance is essentially nil.13
A natural alternative is to check the forecasting ability of the sunspot
model since sunspots represent forward-looking expectations. This alterna-
tive hypothesis is represented in the following equation
lnyd









13It can furthermore be shown that adding the sunspots model to the regression does
not create serial correlations.
17Table 7 reports. In the …rst row, the dependent variable is data output
(private) alone. The next line adds one period lagged model output which
is followed by the case m = 4. The sunspot model, again, has explanatory
power. For example, there is a 16 to 18 percent reduction of the standard
errors in the regression relative to Line 1. The results for total output are
somewhat worse. The one-period lagged arti…cial output is endowed with
incremental predictive power, however, the distributedlag of arti…cial output
is not jointly signi…cant at reasonable probability values (Lines 5 and 6 of
Table 7).
5 Robustness and extensions
This Section discusses the robustness and …rst looks at the explanatory
power of technology shocks. This is followed by considering a model version
in which technology is constant and I show that variable factor utilization
and increasing returns to scale provide an endogenous mechanism for ex-
plaining movements in the naive Solow residual. Finally, I check for robust-
ness by employing an alternative labor series and by considering a di¤erent
representation of the model from which sunspots are extracted.
5.1 The role of technology shocks
At the stage of sunspot estimation, technology was assumed to be stochas-
tic. It would therefore be logical to move to a model that contains TFP
shocks. Let us begin by shutting down the sunspot channel and shock the
model (11) only by the identi…ed shocks to e¢ciency, zt. Table 8 reports. A
real business cycle version of the model contains valuable information. How-
ever, the informational content is abruptly lost for lagged realizations which
indicates that the supply driven economy is lagging.14 It should, of course,
be emphasized that the result is dependent on the current model and, thus,
the results are to some extent unfair to the RBC approach. Taken together,
however, the Subsection …nds that sunspots models are certainly not inferior
to a supply-based explanation and furthermore, it points to the possibility
that factors other than the broadly de…ned shock to e¢ciency may be re-
sponsible for the interwar cycle. This being said, it appears that shutting
down the channel of intertemporal substitutions of TFP shocks may be an
adequate strategy to divulge the riddle of the Great Depression. This will
be done next.
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Figure 6: Sunspots when TFP is not in model
5.2 No role for technology shocks?
Shutting down TFP shocks completely might create a puzzle of its own: how
can this be feasible after the variations in TFP are a fact? I conduct the
following experiment. TFP can be computed as the residual from a naive









In (14) I now ignore both variable capital utilization and increasing returns
as do Fisher and Hornstein (2002). I then ask, is the arti…cial sunspots
economy able to endogenously replicate the zcrs
t -pattern? Let us assume















and sunspots are elicited accordingly. The matrix F is 2£2. The economic
structure parallels the approach taken in Farmer and Guo (1994).
Figure 6 plots the original shock sequence and the new series. Quite
remarkably, the sequences are just about identical – their correlationis 0.988.
Figure 7 plots the computed naive model TFP vis-a-vis data-zcrs
t . Because
of the presence of increasing returns and of variable capacity utilization in
the model, sunspot shocks lead to a procyclical series of naive TFP. The
correlation of arti…cial and data TFP is quite large; even when Lölhö¤el’s













Figure 7: Arti…cial TFP. Data TFP constructed by using Lölhö¤el’s and
Ritschl’s employment series. German TFP detrended by sample trend to
make both series comparable to model (trend for the series is 2 percent and
1.76 percent resp.).
5.3 Robustness with respect to employment data
Given the discussion on TFP and Fisher and Hornstein’s (2002) use of
Lölhö¤el’s employment series, it should be checked if my results can be
replicated when TFP is computed based on Lölhö¤el’s employment data.
Lölhö¤el’s and Ritschl’s series di¤er in the way the employment in the gov-
ernment sector is accounted for. Ritschl’s data is a better representation for
non-government employment than Lölhö¤el’s and it is more volatile.
I use a cubic spline method to transform Lölhö¤el’s annual data into
quarterly frequency. Once again, I …nd that belief shocks and technology






2 = 0:029 SER = 0:0322:
The coe¢cient of technology shocks now has the expected positive sign, how-
ever, it is still not signi…cant. Table 9 shows the signi…cant predictive power
of sunspots. I then add output from the sunspot model to the regression as
in (13) to obtain a measure of to what extent sunspots provide informational
content. The speci…c model is driven by expectational shocks only. Table
10 reports; the analysis is analog to Table 4 to which it should be compared.
Arti…cial output again possesses signi…cant explanatory power. I conclude
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Figure 8: Arti…cial output.
5.4 A di¤erent model reduction
Next, I will demonstrate the non-importance of reducing the dynamic system
to (11). Inthe case of the German Depression, Temin’s (1971) story concerns
an early fall in investment. Thus, the natural question arises if there is
any gain from identifying the sunspots with a residual from the investment
equation (i.e. animal spirits) rather than from the consumption equation in
(11)?15 To address this, I will consider a rearranged reduced-form version
















As before, S denotes the 2 £ 2 Jacobian and e !t+1 ´ Etb xt+1 ¡ b xt+1. I use
this equation again to extract sunspots. Figure 8 shows that the sunspot-
driven economy tracks real data quite well. The arti…cial economy peaks in
1928:I, turns around in 1932:III and predicts a long boom after that. More-
over, the sunspot driven economy accounts for 45 percent of German output
standard deviation (see also footnote 11 on this issue). Table 11 shows that
explanatory model power endures. The economic reason for the equivalence
of both modelling structures is that consumption and investment share one
important characteristic: they are both forward-looking, thus, changes in
expectations are captured in the behavior of both variables.
6 Concluding comments
There are many speculations when it comes to solving the riddle of the
Great Depression in Germany. Existing theories often stress fundamental
15I would like to thank Stephen Broadberry for suggesting this to me.
21imbalances and distortions, like TFP deteriorations, inept …scal policy, repa-
rations, taxes et cetera and all have put forth plausible but certainly not
fully convincing accounts. The present paper challenges the view that mat-
ters were purely fundamental. I …nd that nonfundamental factors, in and
of itself, played a prominent role. In particular, my analysis has tracked
down historical sunspots that had a ripple e¤ect on the German economy.
The paper shows that sunspots contain important information on economic
activity and it points to a tangible fraction of output volatility that is di-
rectly attributable to nonfundamental expectations. Most notable is that
the detrimental shocks began to hit the economy well before other distur-
bances (such as the rise in real interest rates, Gold exports or …nancial
panics) entered the picture. Sunspots therefore o¤er a reason for the early
beginning of the Depression in Germany. In a sense, the paper provides
the theoretical backbone to Temin’s (1971) interpretation of the German
Depression. Temin stresses a fall in domestic investment demand, however,
he leaves unexplained what caused the plunge. The current paper makes a
case for a dramatic swing towards pessimistic expectations that developed
during 1927 which depressed aggregate demand and persisted until the later
half of 1932.
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7 Appendix 1: The linearized model and the tables
Let us denote b yt ´ (yt ¡y)=y et cetera, then the linear model is given by
b yt = ®b ut + ®b kt +¯b lt (A1)
b lt = b yt ¡b ct (A2)
b ±t = b yt ¡ b kt (A3)






b xt = b yt (A5)




Etb yt+1 ¡b kt+1
´
¡ ½±Etb ±t+1 (A6)





b zt+1 = ³b zt +"t+1: (A8)
The static equations (A1) through (A5) yield
¦1
2



























































































































which is equation (11) in the text.
27Table 1
Quarterly model calibration
®À ¯À ½ ± À ³
0:25 0:75 1:03¡1=4 0:0075 0:83 0:95
Table 2






Table 2 – Serial correlation LM test: Breusch-Godfrey tests (various orders) for




1 2 3 4
D 0.049 1.456 1.954 4.168
¢D 2.058 1.943 4.372 6.791
D=Y 0.002 1.640 1.952 5.230
¢D=Y 2.077 1.925 5.734 8.977*
G 0.182 0.275 0.470 0.660
G=Y 0.684 0.632 0.391 1.742
¢G 0.035 0.082 0.238 1.079
¢G=Y 0.705 0.567 0.823 1.556
W 0.004 0.842 2.059 2.616
M=P 0.035 0.082 0.238 1.079
¢M=P 0.765 0.567 0.823 1.556
Interest rate 0.201 0.823 0.875 1.526
P 0.008 0.041 0.236 0.230
¼ 0.785 0.849 0.105 0.912
Table 3 – Table reports test results whether fundamentals reduce forecast vari-
ance of calculated sunspots. The null is that fundamentals do not help to forecast
sunspots. The %-statistics indicate no rejection at least at the 13 percent level (ex-
ception denoted by *). Variables: D = real de…cit, D=Y = real de…cit as fraction
of output, G = real government expenditures, G=Y = government share, M=P
28= real money (base), W = real wage bill, Interest = Privatdiskont in Berlin, P =
CPI, ¼ = growth rate of CPI. ¢ denotes change in variable.
Table 4









Table 4 – The upper part reports R
2
and the lower one changes in R
2
after
sunspots are added to the baseline regression that only included the controls on the
right hand side. The third column displays probability values of the null that the
sunspot variable is zero (log likelihood ratio).
Table 5
Sunspot shocks: variance decomposition
Period ¢lnyT lnyT ¢lnyP lnyP
0 23.3 24.1 41.4 40.0
4 26.6 24.4 49.2 61.8
8 27.0 28.2 49.8 71.9
12 27.1 30.4 49.8 75.3
Table 5 – Cholesky ordering: sunspots, output. VAR containing total output
growth (¢lnyT) and private output growth (¢lnyP) has lag length 3. VAR
containing total output growth (¢lnyT) and private output growth (¢lnyP)
has lag length 5 (detrended); lags determined by Akaike info criteria and Schwarz
criteria.
29Table 6
Regression results I (Sunspot shocks)
Line Variable Coe¢cient R
2 S.E.R. F-statistic Log likelihood
(t-value) (variable) ratio
1 - - 0.938 0.0399 - -
2 ym 0:342
(6:56)
0.967 0.0291 0.000 0.000
3 - - 0.955 0.0311 - -
4 ym 0:321
(4:94)
0.970 0.0253 0.000 0.000
Table 6 – Each line reports regression statistics of German linearly detrended
per capita output on a constant and on own lags using quarterly data 1925:I to
1938:III. Dependent variable: Lines 1 & 2 private output, Lines 3 & 4 total output.
Coe¢cient = estimate when variable is added to regression, SER = standard errors
of regression, F-statistic = probability value of the null that the variable is zero,
Log-likelihood-ratio = probability value of the null that the variable is zero.
Table 7
Regression results II (Sunspot shocks)
Line Variable Coe¢cient R
2 S.E.R. F-statistic Log likelihood
(t-value) (variable) ratio




0.957 0.0334 0.000 0.000
3 ym
¡1 to ¡4 0.960 0.0324 0.000 0.000
4 - - 0.955 0.0311 - -
5 ym 0:253
(2:98)
0.962 0.0288 0.005 0.002
6 ym
¡1 to ¡4 ¡ 0.990 0.0294 0.071 0.037
Table 7 – Each line reports regression statistics of German linearly detrended
per capita output on a constant and on own lags using quarterly data 1925:I to
1938:III. Dependent variable: Lines 1 to 3 private output, Lines 4 to 6 total output.
30Table 8
Regression results (Supply shocks)
Line Variable Coe¢cient R
2 S.E.R. F-statistic Log likelihood
(t-value) (variable) ratio
1 - - 0.938 0.0399 - -
2 ym 0:145
(2:87)




0.940 0.0394 0.143 0.121
4 ym
¡1 to ¡4 - 0.941 0.0394 0.219 0.155
Table 8 – Each line reports regression statistics of German linearly detrended
per capita private output on a constant and on own lags using quarterly data 1925:I
to 1938:III.
Table 9









Table 9 – The upper part reports R
2
and the lower one changes in R
2
after
sunspots are added to regression. The third column displays probability values of
the null that the sunspot variable is zero (log likelihood ratio).
Table 10:
Regression results (Alternative employment series)
Line Variable Coe¢cient R
2 S.E.R. F-statistic Log likelihood
(t-value) (variable) ratio
1 - - 0.938 0.0311 - -
2 ym 0:495
(2:87)
0.963 0.0286 0.006 0.003
3 - - 0.955 0.0399 - -
4 ym 0:165
(1:53)
0.957 0.0307 0.133 0.108
Table 10 – Reports regression statistics of German linearly detrended per capita
output on a constant and own lags using quarterly data 1925:I to 1938:III. Depen-
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Figure 9: Per capita outputs (deviations from linear 1925-1938 trends).
Total output is GNP (Bruttosozialprodukt zu Marktpreisen von 1913). Pri-
vate output is sum of the private sector’s consumption and investment ex-
penditures (Konsum der privaten Haushalte and Investitionen des Unter-
mehmensektors; in 1913-prices). Original source of data: Ritschl (2002b);
1925:I - 1938:III.
Table 11
Regression results (Alternative reduced form)
Line Variable Coe¢cient R
2 S.E.R. F-statistic Log likelihood
(t-value) (variable) ratio
1 - - 0.938 0.0399 - -
2 ym 0:605
(5:48)
0.962 0.0315 0.000 0.000
3 - - 0.955 0.0311 - -
4 ym 0:328
(2:44)
0.960 0.0296 0.019 0.012
Table 11 – Each line reports regression statistics of German linearly detrended
per capita output on a constant and on own lags using quarterly data 1925:I to
1938:III. Dependent variable: Lines 1 & 2 private output, Lines 3 & 4 total output.
32